TEHRAN, Iran · What if a theocracy and a democracy had a
baby? What would it look like? It would look like Iran.
What makes Iran so interesting is that it's not a real democracy, but it's not
a real Islamic theocracy either. It is, though, just enough of a democracy for
many Iranians to know that they want more of it, and just enough of an Islamic
theocracy for many Iranians to know they want less of it.
And if you listen to what's going on behind all the noise here, what you find
are a lot of thinkers, both democrats and religious conservatives, looking for
a way to synthesize these two aspirations.
You find democratic reformers who have learned from the shah's failed attempt
at imposed secularism, and from the past 23 years of Islamic rule, that no
democracy will take root in Iran that doesn't find a respected place for Islam.
And you find religious thinkers who have also learned from the last 23 years
that Iranians have lived through enough incompetent clerics trying to run a
government -- and trying to tell people what they should wear, think and speak
-- to know that Islam can't regulate every aspect of a nation's life in the
modern age without producing a backlash. Many young Iranians are now running
away from the mosques and dislike clerics so much that some mullahs take off
their turbans and robes when they walk around certain neighborhoods, to avoid
being insulted or harassed.
But precisely because Iran is this crazy semi-democracy (unlike Iraq or Saudi
Arabia) -- precisely because people here get arrested every day for speaking
out, then go to prison and write books, then get released, then run for
Parliament, speak out, start a reformist newspaper and get arrested again --
there is a lively debate about how to find a better balance between state and
religion.
One day I went to see Amir Mohebian, the political editor of Ressalat, a
religious conservative newspaper, who told me: "At the time of the revolution
we offered certain [religious] values to the society in a maximalist way. … Now
we are witnessing a backlash. So I am proposing a new definition for an Islamic
society. In this definition we won't try converting people into religious
people. We just don't want to have a deviant society. If we go on pressing for
maximalist religious values, we will increase the gap between the generations.
If we articulate a minimalist definition, we can have a lot in common with the
new generation."
The same day I visited Mohsen Sazgara, a former aide to Ayatollah Khomeini, now
a reformer, who is opening a paper staffed by and directed at Iranian students.
He said: "We believed that we would overthrow the shah and establish a new
government, an Islamic government, that would show the world a new way. But
what we did after the victory of the revolution was not a new way. We did not
succeed in marrying democracy and Islam. That led to the reform movement … But
it has failed, because it had no constitutional power. In the Constitution
there was a religious authority above everything that could always block
changes. So now we have to push for real constitutional democracy -- not
religious democracy but real democracy, with a respected place for religion
under it."
Such a synthesis will take a long time to play out here. For now, the Islamic
regime is still deeply entrenched, thanks to oil money that can buy friends,
and an iron fist that can crush all domestic foes. The hard-line clerics will
not give way easily, and they are not afraid to make enemies abroad, because
tensions help them militarize Iranian society and shut down criticism. Yet even
the hard-line clerics seem to realize that they cannot survive indefinitely on
coercion alone, which is why they let the debate go on.
It's ironic that the war of ideas that the West hoped would be fought in the
Arab Muslim world after Sept. 11 -- a war against the Islamic fascism of Osama
bin Laden that would be waged by Arabs offering a democratic, Islamic,
progressive alternative -- has not happened, because there is not enough
democracy in most places there for that war to even begin. But it is being
fought in Iran -- not in response to Sept. 11, but in response to Iran's own
bad experiences with secular despotism and religious despotism.
Wish them well. If Iranian thinkers and politicians were ever to blend
constitutional democracy with a redefined Islam that limits itself to inspiring
social norms, not running a state, it could have a positive impact on the whole
Muslim world, from Morocco to Indonesia, that Iran's Islamic revolution never
had.
Write to Thomas L. Friedman at The New York Times, 229 W. 43rd St., New York,
NY 10036