Kuningan, Indonesia - Some 1,000 people attacked the peaceful Ahmadi organization in Kuningan in West Java last December, leaving three Ahmadi members severely injured and two of their mosques heavily damaged. It has been alleged that the attack was inspired by the edict of the Indonesian Council of Muslim Scholars, or Majelis Ulama Indonesia, an edict that declared the Ahmadi a deviant sect. This incident was merely the latest in a series of attacks against the group, however.
The Ahmadis have long been targeted by so-called Islamic extremist groups, which have used the MUI's edict as a veneer of authority for their attacks. None of the cases of violence against the Ahmadis has been effectively prosecuted, however, in spite of the Indonesian government ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, whose Article 2 ensures that any person whose rights are violated shall have an effective remedy and that any person claiming a remedy shall have their right determined by a competent judicial authority. Nevertheless, although attacks against the Ahmadis continue, the government ignores the violence directed at them by failing to investigate and prosecute those responsible.
It must be emphasized that the state should not dictate the manner in which religion is practiced nor, indeed, whether one must even subscribe to a religion. Moreover, it should not give any religion sole preference. Islam, however, appears to be exempt from the rules and regulations that apply to other religions in Indonesia, which is evident from the lack of investigation and prosecution of the incessant attacks on the Ahmadis.
The right to freedom of religion is firmly established in Article 18 of the ICCPR, which explicitly states that everyone has the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of personal choice. This right encompasses the freedom to practice both independently and collectively, discreetly or in public. The Indonesian Constitution reiterates this freedom by stating in Article 28 that all citizens have the right to worship and practice their religion according to their beliefs. Nevertheless, there is a clear lack of consistency between the two as is evident by the increasing number of attacks upon "deviant" religious groups.
The prescribed guidelines set by the MUI to define "deviant" teachings and sects are highly contentious. For instance, the criteria for deviance include alternative interpretations of the Koran, which negates the growing variation in interpretation of the Koran necessary for adapting it to modern times.
Disturbingly, labeling groups as "deviant" which do not conform to the MUI prescriptions provides the premise for animosity and violence and triggers widespread campaigns of terror as is evident from the numerous attacks against the Ahmadis. This belligerence inhibits and infringes upon expression and dialogue and, in turn, leads to increased self-censorship.
Furthermore, this aggression clearly contravenes other safeguards of the ICCPR's Article 18 in which the manifestation of a belief is only restricted by the need to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. Yet there is little rationalization of any danger imposed by so-called deviant religious groups before an attack is carried out.
Simply because a group is judged to be "deviant" does not authorize violent attacks. It is clearly unjustifiable and inappropriate for the MUI to possess the moral high ground in determining which religious groups pose a risk. Religion must first and foremost be a matter of personal choice.
Yet from the moment of birth the Indonesian government undermines a person's freedom of religion. By making religion a compulsory element of Indonesian identity cards, the state contradicts Article 18 of the ICCPR, coercing its citizens to adopt and state a specific religion.
This requirement is further compounded by the fact that only six religions are recognized by the state, which repudiates the existence both of world religions, including Judaism and Sikhism, and local faiths, such as Kaharingan and Kejawen. Subsequently, Indonesians who practice religions that are not recognized by the state are obliged to claim they are members of a recognized religion on their identity cards and to live under the guise of believing in a conflicting religion to that of their own. This discriminatory policy fundamentally restricts the freedom of religion of individuals.
Moreover, individuals are restricted not only by the compulsory declaration of their religion but also in access to places of worship. In order for a religious building to be built, 90 people from a village must be willing to utilize the building, which automatically constricts the voices of those in the religious minority. Consequently, individuals in a religious minority have little alternative but to practice their religion at home or at school. Paradoxically, this necessity then places them under the spotlight of the MUI and at greater risk of being classified as unsuitable, which, in turn, exposes them to the risk of attack and violence from militant groups.
As a result of its inertia, the Indonesian government is implicated in the continuing violence against religious minorities and will remain the key perpetrator unless it takes decisive action to prevent attacks on them from escalating. This selective suppression of freedom of religion, particularly of religious minorities, does little to promote or maintain Indonesia's long-famed pluralism and multiculturalism and dashes hopes of minority religions being fully integrated into society.