III. INDIA
A. Introduction
The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has directed its attention to India in light of the disturbing increase in the past several years in severe violence against religious minorities in that country. The violence is especially troubling because it has coincided with the increase in political influence at the national and, in some places, the state level of the Sangh Parivar, a collection of exclusivist Hindu nationalist groups of which the current ruling party, the Bharatiya Janata Party, or BJP, is a part.
India is religiously a very diverse country that generally respects religious freedom. India has a democratically elected government and is governed by the rule of law. However, although the BJP-led government may not be directly responsible for instigating the violence against religious minorities, there is concern that the government is not doing all that it could to pursue the perpetrators of the attacks and to counteract the prevailing climate of hostility, in some quarters in India, against these minority groups. Moreover, the increase of violence against persons and institutions based entirely on religious affiliation is an alarming development in India.
Over the past year, the Commission has extensively examined and studied the situation in India. In September 2000, the Commission held a public hearing on religious freedom in India, which included testimony from Indian nationals of various religious traditions as well as American and Indian U.S. officials, academics, and a former senior U.S. diplomat. The Commission has also received numerous private briefings from academic and other experts, and conducted personal interviews with representatives of victimized groups from India, India experts, academics, former policymakers, and others intimately involved with events in that country. Finally, the Commission made every effort to travel to India to examine the situation directly, but has not yet gained permission from the Indian government. (A formal invitation is required if the Commission is to travel to India in an official capacity, and is the only way of securing the necessary meetings with government officials.) In October 2000, initial inquiries were made to the Indian Embassy in Washington about an invitation, but there was no response. After a meeting with India's ambassador to the U.S. in December, the Commission was assured that inquiries would be made to New Delhi, but nothing more has yet been heard in official channels.
B. Background
1. Demographic Information
India is an extraordinarily diverse country that is home to more than 1 billion people. Approximately 81.3 percent of the population is Hindu, 12 percent Muslim, 2.3 percent Christian, 1.9 percent Sikh, and 2.5 percent other religious groups, including Buddhist, Jain, and Parsi.1 Tribal religious groups also exist, particularly in the middle and northeastern areas of the country. Approximately 68 million of India's citizens are members of these groups, whose religious practices are as varied as are the hundreds of tribes. Although there are sizeable Muslim minorities in nearly all Indian states, the state of Kashmir (or Jammu and Kashmir) is the only one in which Muslims are in the majority, though Muslims are also concentrated in the states of Assam, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal, as well as in the southwest. About 90 percent of India's Muslim population is Sunni and 10 percent Shia. Christians are sizeable minorities in the states of Goa, Kerala, and Manipur, and are the majority in Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland. Several Christian denominations are found in India today, including Roman Catholicism, Anglicanism, Eastern Orthodox, and, more recently, groups of Baptists and other Protestants. Sikhs form the majority in Punjab.
Hinduism is considered indigenous to India and dates back at least 3,500 years. Buddhism and Jainism originated in India around the 6th century BCE. Christianity, according to tradition and legend, is thought to have first come to India through the Apostle Thomas in the 1st century. The spread of Islam in India began in the 8th century, primarily through interaction with Arab traders. Sikhism began in the 16th century in what is now the state of Punjab.
2. Religious Freedom
a. Legal framework
The Indian Constitution guarantees that religion and national identity are separate and distinct entities. Indeed, the preamble of the Indian Constitution proclaims India to be a "sovereign socialist secular democratic republic" that ensures all citizens their right to "liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith, and worship." Other articles of the Constitution prohibit discrimination on the grounds of religion, and guarantee the right to establish religious organizations, the right for religious denominations to manage their own affairs, and the right of religious minorities to establish educational institutions of their choice. In addition, Article 25 provides for "the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion." Moreover, a special act adopted in 1991, the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, prohibits the conversion of any place of worship of any religious denomination into a place of worship of a different religious group and provides for the preservation of the religious nature of places of worship as they existed at the time of independence.
b. Violence targeting religious minorities
i. Muslims
Post-independence India has experienced significant violence between different religious groups. Indeed, Hindu-Muslim tensions go back centuries, and the emergence of both India and Pakistan was colored by the vicious fighting between Hindus and Muslims that accompanied partition; tensions between the two groups have long simmered and sporadic violence against Muslims still occurs.
As Hindu nationalist groups have gained ground in India (see below), the concerns of the Muslim community have heightened. In December 1992, Hindu nationalists destroyed the 16th century Babri mosque in Ayodhya (in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh), and the ensuing nationwide riots left up to 3,000 dead, mostly Muslims, who were reportedly singled out for attack by police. The Srikrishna Commission established to investigate the violence found that the nationalist Shiv Sena party government in Maharashtra state (where Mumbai - previously called Bombay - is located, and which has a significant Muslim minority) engaged in a deliberate and systematic effort to incite violence against Muslims. However, the Shiv Sena-dominated government in Maharashtra called the report "anti-Hindu" and refused to implement the Commission's recommendations. Despite the deadly riots in the aftermath of its destruction, the Ayodhya mosque site remains a live issue, with persistent calls from the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, or RSS, a Hindu nationalist organization, to build a Hindu temple there. In December 2000, the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, proclaimed that the building of a temple on the site was "an expression of national feeling" and part of the "unfinished agenda" of his government. Within two weeks, however, after opposition parties called for the resignation of several of his ministers and a censure vote, he stated that the destruction of the mosque was wrong and "against the Hindu ethos," and that his government would "not allow any illegal attempt to build a Hindu temple" on the site.2 Technically, the matter rests with the Indian courts, though tensions between the two sides remain very high and both Hindu and Muslim groups have vowed to move ahead with plans to build or re-build their place of worship on the site.
In recent years, friction over other holy sites in India has intensified. In many regions of the country, other mosques have been vandalized or destroyed, frequently with the aim of building a Hindu temple on the site. There are numerous shrines in India that are sacred to both Muslims and Hindus, and both groups have generally been able to worship and celebrate at these sites. In the past two years, however, there are increasing reports of extremist Hindu groups threatening to take over and occupy these places, such as, for example, a joint Muslim and Hindu shrine in the southern state of Karnataka. In November 2000, members of the nationalist Hindu cultural organization, Vishwa Hindu Parishad (or World Hindu Council, known by its acronym in Hindi, VHP), and its militant youth wing, Bajrang Dal, forced their way into a mosque in New Delhi and attempted to perform Hindu rituals on the site, claiming that Hindu temples existed on the site before the mosque was built. The VHP promotes the building of temples at hundreds of historic locations, most of which are currently Islamic cultural or sacred sites.
ii. Christians
Since January 1998, violence against Christians has increased dramatically in India. In fact, there has been more violence recorded against the Christian community in India in the past two years than in the previous 52 years since independence. The Indian Parliament reported that 116 attacks occurred against Christians between January 1998 and February 1999, and unofficial figures may be higher. Roman Catholic Church leaders in India put the number of attacks on Christian ministers and churches at 400 (by the end of 2000). These attacks included killings, torture, rape and harassment of church staff, destruction of church property, disruption of church events, and attempts to force renunciation of Christianity and "reconversion" to Hinduism. Many of the incidents involve states in the middle of the country, where Christian organizations provide missionary, humanitarian, and education services to tribal groups or members of India's lower castes.
Perhaps the most notorious attack occurred in January 1999 in the state of Orissa, when a mob shouting Hindu nationalist slogans set fire to and killed Australian Christian missionary Graham Staines and his two sons while they were sleeping in their car. (Staines had worked in India caring for lepers for more than 30 years.) The Wadhwa Commission, a judicial commission of inquiry, found that the government failed to employ adequate resources to find the culprits. The Wadhwa Commission also exonerated Hindu extremist organizations of complicity. Although some suspects were arrested, Bajrang Dal member Dara Singh, who was implicated in the Staines murder, remained "at large," despite his subsequent television appearances and his participation in further attacks in public places. Singh was eventually arrested in January 2000 after he had led a mob killing of a Muslim man, although his trial and that of 13 others for the Staines murder has been postponed four times since then.
Since the Staines murder, the attacks on Christians have continued; indeed, very recent reports indicate renewed attacks on churches, priests, and ministers, particularly in the state of Gujarat. Churches have been broken into, ransacked, looted, and burned both in that state and in the state of Uttar Pradesh by gangs of "sword and knife-wielding extremists."3 Particularly troubling are the continued reports that religious institutions are being pointedly desecrated by militant groups, groups that several Christian leaders describe as associated with the Sangh Parivar. These attacks by militant Hindu groups increased after the RSS's anniversary gathering in October 2000, at which speakers voiced nationalist rhetoric against "foreign" religions.
iii. Sikhs
Sikhs, followers of a 16th century religious teacher from India's Punjab region, have been targets of societal violence and mistreatment by security authorities. The issue is both political and religious, as some Sikh groups in Punjab battle for their own independent nation called Khalistan or Sikhistan. In the struggle, Sikhs have been both perpetrators and victims of violence. In the course of suppressing militant secessionist Sikhs, the Indian army and government officials have been accused of engaging in extra-judicial killings, disappearances, and acts of torture, specifically targeting Sikhs and Muslims) in the region. Violence between Sikhs and Hindus intensified in 1984 when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sent troops into the Sikhs' holiest shrine, the Golden Temple in Amritsar. More than 1,000 Sikhs died during this operation and more than 3,000 Sikhs died in ensuing riots. The government declared presidential rule in Punjab from 1987 to 1992 to help restore order; however, violence between militant Sikh and Hindu groups and security forces has continued. Human rights organizations have concluded that much of the current violence against Sikhs and Muslims in Punjab stems from propaganda by the Sangh Parivar.
iv. Hindus in Tripura State
The majority religious community has also been the subject of attack on the basis of religion. A Christian insurgent group in the northeastern state of Tripura called the National Liberation Front of Tripura, or NLFT, is reported to have banned Hindu and Muslim festivals in areas under its control. The NLFT has also been accused of burning Hindu temples and intimidating tribal peoples to convert to Christianity. The group contends that the dominance of Hinduism has resulted in the marginalization of Christians in Tripura. At the same time, Christian organizations in the northeast region claim an increase in attacks by militant Hindu groups against missionary schools, churches, and facilities in recent years.
c. Government response
Reports from human rights and other groups, including the State Department's 1999 and 2000 Annual Reports on International Religious Freedom, do not implicate the Indian government in organizing or carrying out any of these violent attacks. However, in many of these cases, the government has failed to prosecute the individuals and organizations involved. Security forces have also failed to protect members of religious communities, even in cases where violence was likely. The National Commission on Minorities is frequently tasked with investigating these incidents, but its independence has been called into question, as it all too frequently exonerates the extremist nationalist groups, even in cases where evidence of their involvement is compelling.
Though the BJP-led government has not been directly implicated, many have accused the government of hesitating to prosecute responsible persons or groups, thereby helping to foster a climate in which extremists believe that violence against religious minorities will not be punished. Though the worst of the extremist groups do not have official power, they are closely aligned with those who are in power in India, and they are seen by human rights organizations to be deliberately encouraging an environment of increasing hostility toward religious minorities.
A prominent example of the government's failure adequately to act against those associated with communal violence was this past summer's controversial decision by a Shiv Sena-BJP government magistrate in the state of Maharashtra to dismiss charges against Shiv Sena leader Bal Thackeray for his role in inciting violence against Muslims in the riots following the destruction of the Babri Mosque.4 Similarly, as noted above, Bajrang Dal member Dara Singh remained at large even after he was directly implicated in orchestrating the mob that murdered the Staineses; he was finally arrested only after another mob killing. Moreover, the Wadhwa Commission set up to investigate the Staines killing accused the government of hindering its efforts while not making serious efforts of its own to find the guilty parties.
Admittedly, the national government in India is restricted in its ability to pursue those responsible for the violence because of the limits on its ability to control state law enforcement, the primary mechanism to bring perpetrators of communal violence to justice. Federal statutory mechanisms designed to protect human rights, including the National Minorities Commission and the National Human Rights Commission, have been hampered by limited authority, lack of cooperation by state governments, and, in the case of the Minorities Commission, decisions of questionable objectivity. In addition, virtually all India observers point to grave deficiencies in the country's judicial and law enforcement infrastructure, suggesting that even a decision to take legal action against perpetrators would be hampered by gross shortages of law enforcement officials, lawyers, and judges.
d. Religious conversion
Generally speaking, Hindus do not believe that there is only one path to spiritual salvation or that Hinduism alone upholds that one path.5 Hinduism maintains that all religions contain elements of truth. Thus, to a Hindu, someone who embraces Christianity can still remain a Hindu and need not sever his ties to the Hindu culture. Moreover, some Hindus apparently are deeply offended by what they perceive to be the claim that only one particular religion contains religious truth and that others (including Hinduism) are erroneous. It would seem that these different ideas about the nature of religious faith and claims to religious truth have contributed to some of the tensions among the religious communities in India.
6 India's commitment to a secular state, as well as the right to profess and propagate one's religion, are plainly stated in India's Constitution. However, in 1977, the Indian Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional right to propagate religion did not include a right to convert (or attempt to convert) another. This decision upheld two laws that criminalized conversions under certain circumstances in the states of Orissa and Madhya Pradesh. In November 1999, the Orissa government passed an order preventing conversions without permission from the local police and the District magistrate. (This order is apparently being implemented; at the urging of Hindu groups, police in the Balasore district of Orissa reportedly stopped six tribals from converting to Christianity because a police investigation into their conversion was not yet completed.7) In January 2000, in Uttar Pradesh, the satate passed a law restricting the use and construction of places of worship, a law the local Christian community believes could be used to prevent them from meeting legally. More recently, a bill that would punish "conversion through allurement" by a minimum three-year prison sentence was circulated in the state of Gujarat. There are still reports of various local or municipal governments attempting to put obstacles in the way of religious conversion, though these have thus far not been seen on a national scale.
The Indian Constitution authorizes special benefits for the members of the lower castes (including those referred to as Dalits, meaning "oppressed peoples," the name the untouchables, or lowest caste, have taken for themselves), with the aim of promoting the welfare of those at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder. A certain number of government jobs, for example, by law are reserved for lower-caste members (thus the benefits are referred to as "reservations"). Dalits who convert to Christianity or Islam, however, lose the affirmative action benefits Indian law provides. Those who defend this loss of benefits argue that the caste system only exists within the context of the Hindu religion and thus the denigrated status no longer applies once the person in question converts to another religion. However, even after their conversion, lower-caste members remain burdened with the same socio-economic hardships as before. In 1956, the benefits were extended to Sikhs also. More recently, some legal preferences were extended to Buddhists and Jains as members of religious communities closely related to Hinduism, but thus far to no other religions (though there have been numerous legal challenges on the issue).
Since the 1977 Supreme Court decision against conversion, there have been attempts to introduce national bills that would ban conversion of Dalit and indigenous tribal peoples, but they have so far been unsuccessful. Hindu nationalist groups are particularly critical of proselytizing among Dalits and tribal peoples, claiming that Christian and Muslim groups exploit the tribals' low socio-economic status and tear them from their traditional culture and way of life. However, fierce opposition to conversion to any religion other than Hinduism (or other India-born religions) is an essential element of that nationalist ideology (see section below). In response to such perceived threats, Sangh Parivar members engage in "reconversion" activities to bring tribals back to Hinduism and Hindu culture, even though many were not Hindus before they converted to Christianity or Islam. Though Christians represent a very small fraction of the population (just over 2 percent), nationalist groups maintain that through conversions, aided by foreign missionaries, the Hindu majority will soon be overwhelmed by Christian converts. They have also called for strict limits on the activities of foreign and other Christian missionaries, blaming the country's policy of secularism on their continued presence in India. The RSS and other Sangh Parivar members generally consider Christian missionaries to be a threat to Hinduism, and in the northeastern region of the country, they accuse Christian groups of inciting insurgencies and separatist movements through their missionary activities.
3. Hindu Nationalism and the BJP
The recent increase in violence against religious minorities has been associated with the rise in power of Hindu nationalist organizations, including the Vishna Hindu Parishad (VHP), the Bajrang Dal, and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), as well as their political wing, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). These groups are collectively known as the Sangh Parivar. The BJP has led the national government since 1998 in coalition with regional parties (some without nationalist leanings). The BJP also controls the local government in several states, including in Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, and Maharashtra, where it is the junior partner in a coalition with Shiv Sena.
The ideology of the Sangh Parivar holds that only Hindus are "real" Indians, suggesting that non-Hindus are foreigners and thus deserving of suspicion and even attack.8 Sangh Parivar groups argue that the previous leaders of India failed to create a nation sufficiently grounded in Hindu culture ("Hindutva"), and that Western thought, including the concept of secular government, is dangerous and detrimental to India, along with conversion to what they claim are "foreign" religions such as Islam and Christianity. Members of other religious communities are thus portrayed as foreign implants, and their patriotism and status as true Indian citizens are frequently called into question by Sangh Parivar groups.9 Conversion to Islam or Christianity is designated in the Sangh Parivar literature as a "social evil." Nationalist groups call for the "Hinduization" of education and culture, efforts that have brought protests from Muslim and Christian leaders. The VHP website proclaims that "the teaching of Bharatiya culture (Bharat is the motherland of the Hindu nation) and dharma [should] be made compulsory" and that "Hindu interest is the national interest." The VHP also calls for the repeal of the 1991 Places of Worship (Special Provision) Act. These groups are also responsible for attacks on artists who do not conform to their understanding of what it means to be Indian.
Yet, though Sangh Parivar ideology on the surface appears Hindu in nature, it is noticeably more nationalist than spiritual in content. Many observers and human rights groups draw a distinction between the Hindu religion and Hindutva, the nationalist ideology, and contend that it is the nationalist rather than the religious crusade that has led many of these groups to, for example, undertake "reconversion" campaigns against those who convert to non-Hindu religions.10
One alarming development in the past year was the call by RSS leader K. S. Sudarshan at the group's meeting in October 2000 for the government to "nationalize" the minority religions in India. "It is advisable," he said, "to have a totally Indian church like the one in China," a church that would promote "Indian" values and not recognize foreign authorities such as the Vatican. Muslims, he said, should embrace their "Hindu origins." The statements by Sudarshan raised protests throughout India, including from the BJP government, which made great efforts to distance itself from the remarks.11 Nevertheless, in February 2001, Sudarshan repeated his call for the "Indianization" of Islam, saying Muslims in India should join the "cultural mainstream."12
Some have suggested that rising tensions between the ruling BJP and its associate members of the Sangh Parivar are at least partly behind the government's reluctance to pursue perpetrators of sectarian violence in India. On the one hand, the BJP is apparently experiencing the pressure - and desire - to moderate its views in order to broaden its appeal and power base, and thereby maintain power. On the other, the party is disinclined to alienate the very constituencies that helped bring it to power.
Even in forming the ruling coalition, known as the New Democratic Alliance (NDA), before the elections, the BJP had to win allies in parts of the country where Hindu nationalism has limited influence. Almost immediately upon coming to power, the BJP backed away from three key RSS demands: the building of a temple on the site of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, the repeal of the law giving special status to the region of Jammu and Kashmir, and the implementation of a uniform civil code (which would establish national civil laws for personal status matters now covered by various religious codes). Many believe that the BJP is under constant pressure from its "ideological wing" in the RSS and other groups to make good on these demands, and is regularly criticized by the Sangh Parivar groups for having compromised in order to form the coalition government.
The strains between the BJP and the RSS and other groups were perhaps most evident during and after a recent RSS "camp meeting" in October 2000. At the meeting, RSS leader Sudarshan made rousing speeches filled with fiery nationalist rhetoric about the threats to India from Christian and Muslim Indians who have refused to embrace their Hindu heritage. Home Minister Lal Krishna Advani, who may succeed Vajpayee as leader of the BJP, attended this meeting, and was clearly participating in many of the RSS' "drills." Later, Advani asserted that the bonds between the BJP and the RSS are "unbreakable." However, at the same time, then-BJP President Bangaru Laxman vociferously refuted Advani's assertions, and sought to distance his party from the meeting and its forceful rhetoric.13
4. Secessionist Movements and the Kashmir Conflict
India is wrought with numerous secessionist and other power struggles in many of its states and regions, some of which have become violent. States in India have formed along linguistic and ethnic lines since independence, and ethnic and other loyalties have been sporadically exploited by numerous political parties and movements. There have been demands to form territorial units within states not only along linguistic, ethnic, and religious lines but also, in some cases, based on a feeling of the distinctiveness of a particular region or its cultural or economic interests. The violence in some areas, which regularly takes dozens or even hundreds of lives per year, is usually carried out in the name of a struggle for greater autonomy or independence. In some areas, rival secessionist factions fight each other, with innocent citizens caught in the crossfire. Kashmir, the only Muslim-majority state in India, is perhaps the most widely known and protracted secessionist struggle in India. For decades, human rights organizations have accused the Indian government of committing atrocities against civilians in the process of subduing militant secessionist groups in Kashmir. These violations include indiscriminate shootings, assault, rape, disappearances, custodial killings, torture, and forced confessions. More recently, militant Muslim separatist groups have often targeted Kashmiri Hindus (called Pandits), who have been resented since a Hindu ruler ceded Kashmir to India. The Indian government accuses Pakistan of funding militant groups in Kashmir, while Pakistan insists that it only offers political support for such groups.
The conflict intensified in the late 1980's, when Indian rule became harsher and Pakistan stepped up its support of certain militant groups. Pakistani and Indian troops have exchanged fire on several occasions, most recently in 1999. Indian security forces intensified their crackdown on Muslims in the Kashmir valley, and have been increasingly implicated in massacres of civilians, arbitrary arrests, rape, and torture. Thousands of Kashmiri Muslims have been killed since the conflict has heightened, many while in government detention.14 At the same time, Muslim militants have targeted Hindus (and sometimes Sikhs), resulting in a number of killings and approximately 200,000-250,000 Hindus displaced from the Kashmir valley (though there are also Kashmiri Muslim and Sikh refugees).15 Though the Kashmiri Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh civilian populations often co-exist peacefully in their neighborhoods, they are victims of abuse by militant groups and armed forces from all sides. Sikhs, who comprise a small minority in Kashmir, have generally not been targeted for violence. However, 35 Sikhs were killed while worshipping in a Sikh temple in March 2000, reportedly by militants, representing a new and dangerous direction in the conflict.
The conflict in Kashmir does not appear fundamentally to be a religious war, but rather a fight over who will, in the end, govern the region - Pakistan, India, or the Kashmiris themselves. More than anything else, the conflict has reflected the bitter and obsessive rivalry between India and Pakistan. However, the nature of the fighting in the past decade has indicated a greater tendency to bring religion directly into the conflict.
C. Commission Recommendations
1. The U.S. government should persistently press India to pursue perpetrators of violent acts that target members of religious groups. Violent attacks against members of minority religious communities and their institutions, and sometimes against the majority community, have increased in India in recent years. The Indian government has repeatedly maintained that it is doing what it can to apprehend the aggressors. But many observers believe that these efforts have not been adequate and that the government simply has not committed the necessary resources and force of will to the issue. Also, even in cases where there were early warnings of violence, police officers have often failed to provide adequate protection of targeted communities.
American concerns about violence against religious minorities should thus continue to be forcefully expressed, not least within the context of India's desire to be accepted and treated by the U.S. as a major regional leader and functioning democracy. If India wants to be received as such, it must do more to demonstrate that it is a country governed by the rule of law, with legitimate and functioning law-enforcement structures. The government should also do more to make explicit its commitment to its own laws with regard to religious freedom and toleration. The U.S. government should make clear that the Indian government's failure to do all it can to protect religious minorities from violent attacks raises serious questions about its commitment to abide by its own constitutional provisions and its obligations under international law. A continued decline in respect for religious freedom would present a serious obstacle in U.S.-Indian relations.
2. The U.S. government should make clear its concern to the BJP-led government that virulent nationalist rhetoric is fueling an atmosphere in which perpetrators believe they can attack religious minorities with impunity. While fully protecting freedom of expression, firm words and actions from the government of India are required to counteract this belief.
The BJP leaders in the government have consistently claimed that the growing influence of the RSS and other Hindu nationalist organizations is not connected to the outbreak of violence against Christians and Muslims in recent years. Yet, the ruling BJP is a Hindu nationalist party that, as part of the Sangh Parivar, seeks to spread the concept of Hindutva. According to Hindutva, a truly Indian identity includes adhering to the Hindu religion (including Buddhism and Jainism, which nationalists perceive as Hindu in origin), the only religion that is not a foreign import to India. Since members of minority religious communities such as Islam and Christianity are described as outsiders, their loyalty as Indian citizens is frequently challenged by Sangh Parivar groups.
Taking note of the BJP's recent attempts to distance itself from the more extremist demands of the RSS and other nationalist groups, the U.S. government should nevertheless make clear its concern that even if there is no official encouragement of violence against religious minorities, there is much within the "culture" of the Sangh Parivar that encourages it. Moreover, though it has not been directly implicated, some have accused the BJP-led government of tolerating the nationalist rhetoric and looking the other way concerning the involvement of nationalist groups in incidents of violence, thereby helping to foster the climate in which extremists believe that violence against religious minorities will be condoned. The National Commission on Minorities, for example, frequently tasked with investigating these incidents, invariably finds that the nationalist groups are not implicated in any way, even in cases where forceful evidence indicates precisely the reverse.
While on occasion BJP leaders distance themselves from extreme statements and legal actions exonerating perpetrators, the BJP cannot claim with any credibility that this kind of nationalist rhetoric from Sangh Parivar members is not related at all to the violent attacks on religious minorities in India. For this reason, the U.S. government should urge the government of India to speak and act in ways that make clear its lack of sympathy or support for religious intolerance and persecution.
3. The U.S. government should support the stated policy of the BJP to oppose any move toward the nationalization of any religious institutions in India. The U.S. government should also press the government of India to oppose any attempts to interfere with or prohibit ties between religious communities inside India and their co-religionists outside the country, and any government efforts to regulate religious choice or conversion.
In October 2000 and again in February 2001, RSS leader K. S. Sudarshan called on the government to "nationalize" the Christian churches and to "Indianize" the Muslim community in India. The statements by Sudarshan, however, raised protest throughout India, including from the BJP government.
In light of these recent statements from RSS leaders, the Indian government must continue to make absolutely clear its opposition to any moves toward establishing "nationalized churches" or state-controlled religious institutions, or to interfere improperly with relations between Indian religious communities and their foreign co-religionists. The Indian government should also continue to oppose any attempt on the part of nationalist groups to determine the appropriate cultural context of the faith of the minority communities. Such actions would be inconsistent with the democratic principles enshrined in India's constitution and its international human rights commitments, and would threaten to degrade further the protection of religious freedom in India.
As noted above, the U.S. government should express its concern that politically significant forces in India are actively promoting a national, patriotic identity in what can be viewed as religiously exclusive terms and defining national values on the basis of those terms. Likewise, the U.S. government should make clear that it views with concern any attempt by the Indian government to control or regulate religious communities and their institutions to promote or protect such national values. The Indian government should reaffirm its policy that it does not initiate or tolerate any attempt to interfere with or regulate the ability to choose or change one's religious identity or affiliation.
4. As the U.S. government pursues greater engagement with India on a full range of issues, it should take advantage of new opportunities for government-to-government cooperation and communication on human rights, including religious freedom. Though India and the United States have often been at odds for much of the past 50 years, the relationship has improved greatly and may become even warmer. Key issues between the U.S. and India have come to include regional stability, progress on a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Kashmir, security and nuclear proliferation, counter-terrorism, trade and investment, environmental protection, clean energy production, counter-narcotics activities, disease control, and human rights, including religious freedom. In March 2000, President Clinton visited India as part of a major initiative to set U.S.-Indian relations on a new foundation of cooperation on shared concerns. In September 2000, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee returned the visit by traveling to Washington. During the visit, President Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee signed a joint statement agreeing to cooperate on arms control and in combating terrorism and AIDS.
In the post-Cold War era, there is great opportunity for government-to-government cooperation on such issues as human rights and the protection of religious freedom. More channels of communication should be opened at all levels to achieve these aims. An appropriate role for the growing Indian-American community in this process should also be explored.
5. The U.S. should press India to allow official visits from government agencies concerned with human rights, including religious freedom.
In 1999 and 2000, India refused to permit an official visit from the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom. As discussed above, although the Commission first sought to visit India in the fall of 2000, as of the date of this report it has not received permission from the Indian government to do so. India consistently proclaims itself to be an important member of the international community, and if it wants to be accepted as such, it must act in accordance with international norms of democratic practice, which includes internal - and external - scrutiny. The U.S. government should press for the acceptance of official visits by the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom and by the Commission.
6. The U.S. government should encourage and facilitate private-sector communication and exchanges between Indian and American religious groups and other non-governmental organizations interested in religious freedom. The U.S. government should also press India to allow visits from non-governmental human rights organizations and other groups concerned with religious freedom.
India is a functioning democracy and an extremely complex country and society. There is an active community of religious groups and other NGO's concerned with human rights, including religious freedom, that operates relatively freely in India. Thus, wherever possible, American groups concerned about these issues should be encouraged to work together with their Indian counterparts. The activities of the Indian NGO's make plain that the Commission's concerns about religious freedom do not represent "outside interference," but reflect instead concerns of many of India's own citizens - from all religious traditions. The U.S. government should also make clear that its commitment to religious freedom as an element of its foreign policy is not a judgment on the effectiveness of India's own human rights organizations. The U.S. government should thus take an active role in facilitating cooperation and exchanges between religious communities and NGO's on the subjects of religious freedom and tolerance.
At the same time, India stands out among democratic countries in its refusal of regular, unrestricted visits from internationally recognized non-governmental human rights organizations and its refusal also to permit their official presence in country. This conduct is not in accordance with India's international human rights commitments or with a transparent, functioning democracy that allows its citizens access to internationally recognized human rights monitors.
7. The U.S. government should allocate funds from its foreign assistance programs for the promotion of education on religious toleration and inclusiveness in India. Independent India was founded on, and since independence has generally been committed to, secularism, understood as the separation between religion and citizenship and the prevention of sectarian conflict. The Indian Constitution guarantees that religion and national identity are separate and distinct. In addition, there are numerous articles in the Constitution and other legal codes ensuring religious freedom in India.
U.S. funds earmarked for democratization efforts should be used specifically to promote a greater understanding of India's different religious communities, its religiously inclusive tradition, its constitutional commitment to the separation of religion and government, and the ways in which India has been successful as a multicultural and multitraditional society.
8. In the course of working toward improvements in U.S.-Indian economic and trade relations, the U.S. government should take into account the efforts of the Indian government to protect religious freedom, prevent and punish violence against religious minorities, and promote the rule of law. If progress is made, the U.S. should seek ways in which it can respond positively through enhanced economic ties.
In the last decade, India has begun to shift away from its socialist and statist economic policies and pursue American trade and investment, seeking ways to improve its foreign investment climate. Abandoning some of its strictest protectionist policies, India now allows foreign ownership of Indian firms and major American brands have begun to enter (or re-enter) the Indian marketplace. Bilateral trade by the end of the decade had reached $12 billion annually, with the balance of trade in India's favor at $6 billion.
However, trade and other relations were interrupted when the United States imposed comprehensive sanctions on India after its May 1998 nuclear weapons tests. The economic and political sanctions on India, mandated by the Arms Export Control Act, cut off all but humanitarian aid. Today, sanctions technically remain in place, and cannot be removed until current U.S. laws mandating them are repealed. However, in 1998 and 1999, Congress gave the president authority to waive several economic sanctions, with the result that some have been lifted temporarily, such as non-military sanctions involving agricultural exports and export credits. For example, in July 1998, President Clinton signed the Agriculture Export Relief Act, thereby amending the Arms Export Control Act by exempting food and other agricultural commodity purchases from nuclear non-proliferation sanctions for one year. In October, the President was given the authority to waive economic sanctions on India (and Pakistan) for one year. And in November 1998, the President reduced sanctions against India in response to positive steps taken by it to address U.S. non-proliferation concerns. This action restored Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and Trade and Development Agency programs, and also repealed the restrictions on the activities of American banks there. Most of these sanctions were waived once again in 1999.
During President Clinton's March 2000 visit to India, U.S. companies signed $4 billion in projects with Indian (and Bangladeshi) firms, and the President announced $2 billion in financial support for U.S. exports to India through the U.S. Export-Import Bank. During the September 2000 visit of Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee to Washington, U.S. officials announced $900 million in Export-Import Bank financing to help Indian businesses purchase American goods and services. Agreements were also signed by American companies to construct three large power projects as part of increased energy cooperation.
American aid to India is modest in comparison to the country's size and population. American aid peaked in the mid-1960s and dropped steadily through the 1980s. American leverage through foreign assistance is thus admittedly low. For fiscal year 2000, $48.5 million in development assistance was earmarked for India, and $82.4 million in PL-480 food assistance, both of which are exempt from sanctions.
Should the U.S. government continue to waive economic sanctions against India and promote greater trade and investment, the implementation of our economic policies should take into account the progress of the Indian government on protecting religious freedom, ensuring the safety of religious minorities, and promoting the rule of law. The U.S. government should make clear to India that a stronger determination to address its law and order problems would do much to demonstrate that India is a stable society with legitimate institutions capable of dealing with those problems. In that case, the U.S. should review its economic engagement with India to determine how it can further promote such progress. Evidence of the improvements discussed above should be a factor in determining the level of U.S. assistance through the Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Commodity Credits Corporation, and Trade and Development Agency.